In the years following Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, during which Israel captured the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli society became somewhat complacent. This complacency also affected the security establishment, which developed the “Conception” (the strategic assumption) that Arab nations would only attack Israel in coordination and only if they were convinced they could achieve air superiority to win. However, this conception was based on the belief that Arab nations wanted to destroy Israel, a premise not shared by Egypt’s leader at the time.
This leader, Anwar Sadat, had come to power in Egypt after Nasser’s death in 1970. Sadat concluded that Nasser’s attempts to unify the Arab world, align with the Eastern Bloc, and fight Israel to the end had failed, costing Egypt development, its economy, and many lives. Sadat wanted to focus on Egypt’s development, end the conflict with Israel, and gain the support of the United States. To this end, he tried to engage Israel in initial negotiations, but when this failed, Sadat decided that war was necessary to impose a cost on Israel and push it toward peace.
Sadat approached Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and proposed a joint surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur (which also fell on October 6, Assad’s birthday), though he did not reveal Egypt’s limited objectives. Assad agreed, and the countries began preparations for war. In Israel, reports of these preparations encountered the “Conception” barrier, led by Military Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. It was only on the morning of Yom Kippur, after receiving concrete warnings from the Mossad, that Chief of Staff David Elazar managed to convince Prime Minister Golda Meir to mobilize reserve forces. However, it was too little, too late, and by midday, the IDF was caught by surprise with a large-scale attack on two fronts.
The first days of the war went badly for the IDF, which struggled to deploy against the attack. The armored and air forces were surprised by advanced anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and suffered heavy losses. In the north, Syrian forces advanced, capturing all of southern Golan Heights and approaching the shores of the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee), along with the Golan Heights outpost. In the south, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal at two key points, capturing all Israeli outposts along the “Bar-Lev Line” (except for one). A counteroffensive organized by the Chief of Staff on October 8 failed, resulting in heavy casualties.
However, in the following days, a turnaround occurred as reserve forces managed to stabilize the fronts. In the north, the Syrians were pushed out of southern Golan, and Israel even penetrated into Syrian territory, threatening Damascus. In the south, a major Egyptian offensive failed, and the command structure was reinforced by senior reserve commanders such as Ariel Sharon and Chaim Bar-Lev.
In the two weeks that followed, Israel completely reversed the situation, with the U.S. launching an “airlift” of weapons and equipment (so much so that the IDF ended the war with 133% of its original tank strength). In the south, IDF forces crossed the Suez Canal at its center and maneuvered southward to the Red Sea, encircling the Egyptian Third Army, which was trapped in Israeli-held territory. In the north, Mount Hermon was recaptured, and heavy counterattacks by the Syrian army, supported by units from Jordan and Iraq, were repelled.
At this stage, three weeks after the war’s outbreak, the parties began negotiations to end the war and sign a ceasefire (although in the northern front, a war of attrition continued for several months). Israel agreed to withdraw from the Suez Canal line, reopen it for shipping, and return to the pre-war borders in the Golan Heights.
It is difficult to assess the war’s overall impact. Militarily, the IDF clearly emerged victorious, marking one of the most impressive triumphs in modern warfare. However, on a moral level, the collapse of the “Conception” led to a deep sense of frustration in Israel. The Agranat Commission was established, leading to the resignation of the Chief of Staff and numerous changes in IDF intelligence doctrines. Soon after, both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister also resigned. Socially, the war had long-lasting effects on Israel, contributing to the rise of the Gush Emunim movement on the one hand and the peace movement on the other, culminating in the 1977 “upheaval” that reshaped Israeli politics. Diplomatically, it is clear that Sadat achieved his goals, as within a few years, a peace agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel, and both countries, along with Israel, strengthened ties with the United States.
