In light of numerous reports in recent weeks about various Israeli citizens being recruited by the Iranian regime for espionage or disruptive activities, Israeli citizens are increasingly aware of the threat and are taking active steps to prevent it. According to Israel Hayom, over 100 reports have been submitted to the police regarding attempts by Iranian agents to recruit or persuade them to carry out tasks for the revolutionary regime. This aligns with police requests to report any suspicions about the credibility of individuals attempting to contact Israeli citizens.
The Method: Phishing on Telegram
Information from previous espionage cases suggests that Iranian intelligence does not specifically target pre-selected candidates for espionage but instead uses a “phishing” approach—casting a wide net and hoping to catch someone. This typically involves sending mass messages offering easy money through social media platforms, especially Telegram, in the hope of reaching naive or morally vulnerable individuals. Iranian intelligence often delays revealing its true identity until the last moment, aiming to create a fertile ground for cooperation between the individual and the regime.
Even after identifying a cooperative individual, the severity of tasks escalates gradually. Initially, agents assign simple and seemingly legal tasks, perceived as “easy money,” such as photographing specific locations, protests, or individuals. These tasks can escalate to more serious actions, such as hanging banners, burning vehicles, or spraying graffiti. Ultimately, the most severe tasks are introduced—attempted assassinations, photographing military bases, or obtaining classified information. The recruited individual is drawn in step by step, often unaware of the gravity of their actions until it is too late.
Potential Agents: From Across Society
This method has proven effective for the Iranians in recruiting a wide range of collaborators with little in common, except perhaps a weak connection to the state or financial instability. These have included a group of seven teenagers from northern cities, most of them immigrants from the former Soviet Union; a couple from Ramat Gan; several young ultra-Orthodox teens from Beit Shemesh; and a businessman from Ashkelon.
Despite the recent successes of the Shin Bet and other Israeli intelligence agencies, it is important to remember that this is a highly challenging battle for the security apparatus, which cannot (and does not want to) monitor the social media activity of all Israeli citizens. Ultimately, this phenomenon can only be eradicated through civil cooperation—citizens alerting the police to suspicious communication on social media to identify specific suspects, and fostering a social culture that rejects and ostracizes despicable acts of espionage for the enemy during times of war.
